# A NEW MULTI PARTY KEY AGREEMENT PROTOCOL USING SEARCH PROBLEMS IN DISCRETE HEISENBERG GROUP.

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#### **Abstract:**

In this paper we present a multi-party Key Agreement Protocol (KAP) using some of the search problems such as Factorization Search Problem , Decomposition Search Problem Conjugacy Search Problem and Twisted Conjugacy Problem. We have chosen Discrete Heisenberg group as our platform group in the above search problems.

*Keywords*: Factorization Search Problem; Decomposition Search Problem;,Conjugacy Search Problem; Twisted Conjugacy Problem and Discrete Heisenberg group.

## 1 Introduction:

A key exchange is a protocol by which two parties, commonly named Alice and Bob, agree on a secret key to use in their subsequent private communication. Key exchange is an essential part of public key system. The first key exchange scheme was introduced by Diffie and Hellman in 1976, and independently by Merkle in 1978. So far ,several key exchange protocols have been developed using the concept of combinatorial group theory, namely the Word Problem, Conjugacy Search Problem, Decomposition Problem, Triple Decomposition Problem Membership Search Problem and so on. In this paper we introduce some of the search problems in the Discrete Heisenberg group [11].

In Crypto 2000 [9],Ko et al proposed a new public key cryptosystem based on Braid groups which are non-abelian; they have used the search problems to build the Cryptosystem. Then Paeng et al [13] proposed a New Public Key Cryptosystem using the Discrete Log Problems in inner automorphisms of the semi-direct product of special linear groups (non-abelian) with  $Z_p$ . The above system was named as MOR cryptosystem. Using Unitriangular[3], and Unimodular matrices, Ayan Mahalonobis[4] modified the MOR cryptosystem.

Vladmir Shplirain and Alexander Ushakov [14] used the decomposition problem on Braid groups Vladmir Shplirain and GobrielbZapata [15] used the subgroup membership search problem on Braid groups

Yesem Kurt[16] proposed a key exchange protocol using triple decomposition problem on Braid groups. A.Joux [8] proposed a One Round Protocol for tripartite Diffe-Hellman, In W.Bosma ,editor Proceedings of Algorithmic Number Teory ,Symposium ,ANTS IV ,volume 1838 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science ,Pages 385 -394 ,Springer Verlag,2000

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Zhaohui Cheng, Luminita Vasiu and Richard Comley [17] proposed Pairing- Based One –Round Tripartitie Key Agreement Protocol.

Ho -Kyu, Hyang -Sook Lee ,Young -Ran Lee[12] [proposed a Multiparty Authenticated Key Agreement Protocols From Multilinear Forms.

The paper is organized in the following manner. In section 2 we discuss some computational facts about the Discrete Heisenberg Group. Section 3 deals with the Factorization Search Problem and a Multi party KAP using the same. In Section 4 we present a multiparty KAP using Decomposition Search Problem . Section 5 deals about the multiparty KAP using Conjucacy Search Problem . In Section 6 we discuss the Twisted Conjugacy Problem and a multi party KAP and we conclude the paper in Section 7.

#### 2.Introduction To Discrete Heisenberg Group:

The Discrete Heisenberg group  $\mathcal{H}$  may be described as the set  $Z_p^3$  of all integer triples endowed with the following multiplication, where p is a prime

$$(x, y, z) \cdot (u, v, w) = (x + u + yw, y + v, z + w) \mod p$$

# 2.1. Some Computational Facts About H.

The following computational facts about  $\mathcal H$  can be easily derived from the definition of multiplication above .

## 2.1.1. Proposition.

Let x, y, z, u, v, w, n be any integers. Then the multiplication in  $\mathcal H$  satisfies the following equations:

```
(a) (x, y, z)^{-1} = (-x + yz, -y, -z) \mod p
```

(b) 
$$(x, y, z) \cdot (u, v, w) \cdot (x, y, z)^{-1} = (u + yw - zv, v, w) \text{ modp}$$

(c) 
$$[(x, y, z), (u, v, w)] = (yw - zv, 0, 0) \mod p$$

(d) In particular, 
$$[(0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)] = (1, 0, 0)$$
.

(e) (i)(x, 0, 0) 
$$\cdot$$
 (0, y, z) = (x, y, z) mod p

$$(ii)(0, y, 0) \cdot (0, 0, z) = (yz, y, z) \bmod p$$

$$(iii)(0, 0, z) \cdot (0, y, 0) = (0, y, z) \mod p$$

(f) 
$$(i)(1, 0, 0)^n = (n, 0, 0) \mod p$$

$$(ii)(0, 1, 0)^n = (0, n, 0) \bmod p$$

$$(iii)(0, 0, 1)^n = (0, 0, n) \text{ mod } p$$

## 2.1.2. Centre $Z[\mathcal{H}]$ :

Centre of  $\mathcal{H}$  coincides with  $Z \times 0 \times 0$  where  $\mathcal{H} = Z_p^{3}$ , [H, H] = Z[H].

# 2.1.3. Generators of H:

Formulae (d)-(f) show that (0, 1, 0) and (0, 0, 1) generate H. Specifically,  $(x, y, z) = [(0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1)]^x \cdot (0, 0, 1)^z \cdot (0, 1, 0)^y$ , for all (x, y, z) in  $\mathcal{H}$ . For the next result, we use the non-standard notation  $n^{(2)}$  to stand for n(n-1)/2, for any integer 'n'.

## 2.2. Proposition.

```
For any (x, y, z) \in \mathcal{H} and any n \in \mathbb{Z}, we have (x, y, z)^n = (nx + n^{(2)}yz, ny, nz).
```

# 2.3. Proposition.

```
\mathcal{H} may be presented as <\alpha,\beta: [\alpha,[\alpha,\beta]]=1=[\beta,[\alpha,\beta]]>, with \alpha (resp.,\beta) corresponding to the generator (0,1,0) (resp., (0,0,1)). The following results have been already established:
```

#### 2.3.1. Result 1:

Let L be any group, and let  $\sigma$  and  $\tau$  be any elements of L satisfying the two relations given above . Then, there is a unique homomorphism  $h:\mathcal{H}\to L$  such that  $h(0,\,1,\,0)=\sigma$  and  $\,h(0,\,0,\,1)=\tau$ 

#### 2.3.2. Result 2:

Let  $\sigma$  and  $\tau$  be any elements of  $\mathcal{H}$ . There exists a unique endomorphism h of  $\mathcal{H}$  such that  $h(0, 1, 0) = \sigma$  and  $h(0, 0, 1) = \tau$ .

#### 3. Factorization Search Problem:

Given an element w of a group G and two subgroups A ,B  $\leq$ G,find any two elements a  $\in$ A, b  $\in$ B that would satisfy a.b = w.

# 3.1.Two Party Key Exchange Protocol:

Two parties A and B agree on the Discrete Heisenberg Group and two cyclic subgroups  $G_1$  and  $G_2$  of  $\mathcal{H}$  (Discrete Heisenberg group).

 $G_1$  is generated by two commuting elements of  $\mathcal{H}$ .  $G_2$  is generated by two other commuting elements which do not commute with the generators of  $G_1$ .

- 1.A chooses two random elements  $a_1 \in G_1$ ,  $b_1 \in G_2$ .
- 2.A computes  $S_A = a_1b_1$  and sends the same to B.
- 3.B chooses two random elements  $a_2 \in G_1$ ,  $b_2 \in G_2$
- 4.B computes  $S_B = a_2b_2$  and sends the same to A.
- 5.On knowing  $a_1$  and  $b_1$ , A computes  $K_A = a_1 S_B b_1$ .
- 6.On knowing  $a_2$  and  $b_2$ , B computes  $K_B = a_2 S_A b_2$ .

Since  $a_1, a_2 \in G_1$  they commute and  $b_1, b_2 \in G_2$  they too commute. Hence  $K_A = K_B$  is their common shared key.

## 3.2. Three Party Key Agreement Protocol:

Three parties  $A_1$ ,  $A_2$  and  $A_3$  agree on the Discrete Heisenberg Group and two cyclic subgroups  $G_1$  and  $G_2$  of  $\mathcal{H}$  (Discrete Heisenberg group).

 $G_1$  is generated by two commuting elements of  $\mathcal{H}$ .  $G_2$  is generated by two other commuting elements which do not commute with the generators of  $G_1$ .

## First Round:

```
1.A<sub>1</sub> chooses two random elements a_1 \in G_1, b_1 \in G_2.
```

 $2.A_1$  computes  $K_{11}\!\!=a_1b_1$  and sends the same to  $A_2\,$  .

 $3.A_2$  chooses two random elements  $a_2 \in G_1$ ,  $b_2 \in G_2$ .

 $4.A_2$  computes  $K_{12} = a_2b_2$  and sends the same to  $A_3$ .

 $5.A_3$  chooses  $% A_{3}=A_{3}=A_{3}=A_{3}$  two random elements  $a_{3}\in G_{1}$  ,base  $G_{2}$ 

 $6.A_3$  computes  $K_{13} = a_3b_3$  and sends the same to  $A_1$ .

7.A<sub>1</sub> receives  $K_{13}$  from  $A_3$  and computes  $K_{21} = a_1 K_{13} b_1$ .

8.A<sub>2</sub> receives  $K_{11}$  from  $A_1$  and computes  $K_{22} = a_2 K_{11} b_2$ .

9.A<sub>3</sub> receives  $K_{21}$  from A<sub>2</sub>and computes  $K_{23} = a_3 K_{23} b_3$ .

## Second Round:

 $A_1$  sends  $K_{21}$  to  $A_2$ .

 $A_2$  sends  $K_{21}$  to  $A_3$ .

 $A_3$  sends  $K_{23}$  to  $A_1$ .

- 1.A<sub>1</sub> on knowing  $a_1,b_1$  computes  $K_{31} = a_1K_{23} b_1$ .
- 2.  $A_2$  on knowing  $a_2,b_2$  computes  $K_{32} = a_2 K_{21}b_2$ .
- 3.  $A_3$  on knowing  $a_3$ , $b_3$  computes  $K_{33} = a_3 K_{22}b_3$ .

Since  $a_1$ ,  $a_2$ ,  $a_3 \in G_1$  and  $b_1$ ,  $b_2$ ,  $b_3 \in G_2$  they commute and they have common shared key is

 $K_{31} = K_{32} = K_{33} = a_1 a_2 a_3 b_1 b_2 b_3$ .

## 3.3. Multi Party Key Agreement Protocol:

```
First Round:
A_1 chooses two random elements a_1 \in G_1, b_1 \in G_2.
A_1computes K_{11}=a_1b_1 and sends the same to A_2.
A_2 chooses two random elements a_2 \in G_1, b_2 \in G_2.
A_2 computes K_{12} = a_2b_2 and sends the same to A_3.
A_3 chooses two random elements a_3 \in G_1, b_3 \in G_2.
A_3 computes K_{13} = a_3b_3 and sends the same to A_4.
.....
A_{k-1} chooses two random elements a_{k-1} \in G_1, b_{k-1} \in G_2.
A_{k-1} computes K_{1k-1} = a_{k-1} b_{k-1} and sends the same to A_k
A_k chooses two random elements a_k \in G_1, b_k \in G_2
A_k computes K_{1k} = a_k b_k and sends it to A_1.
Second Round:
A_1 computes K_{21} = a_1 K_{1k} b_1 and sends the same to A_2
A_2 computes K_{22} = a_2 K_{11} b_2 and sends the same to A_3.
A_3 computes K_{23} = a_3 K_{12} b_3 and sends the same to A_4.
.....
.....
A_{k-1} computes K_{2(k-1)} = a_{k-1} K_{1k-2} b_{k-1} and sends the same to A_k.
A_k computes K_{2k} = a_k K_{1(k-1)} b_k and sends the same to A_1.
(K-1)^{St} Round:
A_1 computes K_{(k-1)1} = a_1 a_k a_{k-1} \dots a_2 b_2 \dots b_{k-1} b_k b_1.
A_2computes K_{(k-1)2} = a_2 a_1 a_k a_{k-1} \dots a_3 b_3 \dots b_{k-1} b_k b_1 b_2.
.....
A_{k-1} computes K_{(k-1)(k-1)} = a_{k-1} a_{k-2} a_{k-3} \dots a_1 a_k b_k b_1 \dots b_{k-3} b_{k-2} b_{k-1} b_{k-1}
A_k computes K_{(k-1)k} = a_k a_{k-1} \dots a_1 b_1 \dots b_{k-1} b_k.
Since a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in G_1 and b_1, b_2, \dots, b_k \in G_2
K_{(k-1)1} = K_{(k-1)2} = \dots = K_{(k-1)k}, their common shared key.
```

# 4.Decomposition Search Problem:

Given the following:

i) Rrecursive presentation of a group G,

ii) Two recursively generated subgroups A ,B ≤G,

iii)Two elements w,  $w_1 \in G$ ,

iv) To find two elements  $x \in A$ ,  $y \in B$  that would satisfy

x.w.y = $w_1$ , provided at least one such pair of elements exist.

### **Key Agreement Protocol Using Decomposition Search Problem:**

### 4.1. KAP With Two Parties:

```
One of the parties (say ,A<sub>1</sub>)publishes a random element w \in \mathcal{H}. They agree on two cyclic subgroups G_1 and G_2 of \mathcal{H} ( Discrete Heisenberg group) G_{1=} < e ,a ,b > such that ab = ba and a ,b \in \mathcal{H} . G_2 = < e,c,d > such that c = dc and c ,d c \in \mathcal{H} . Also 'a' and 'b' do not commute with 'c' and 'd' c \in \mathcal{H} and sends it to c \in \mathcal{H} and sends it to c \in \mathcal{H} and sends it to c \in \mathcal{H} on knowing c \in \mathcal{H} and c \in \mathcal{H} and c \in \mathcal{H} on knowing c \in \mathcal{H} and c \in \mathcal{H} and c \in \mathcal{H} on knowing c \in \mathcal{H} and c \in \mathcal{H} on knowing c \in \mathcal{H} and c \in \mathcal{H} and c \in \mathcal{H} on knowing c \in \mathcal{H} and c \in \mathcal{H} and c \in \mathcal{H} and c \in \mathcal{H} on knowing c \in \mathcal{H} and c \in \mathcal{H} and c \in \mathcal{H} and c \in \mathcal{H} on knowing c \in \mathcal{H} and c \in \mathcal{H} on knowing c \in \mathcal{H} and c
```

## 4.2 . KAP With Three Party :

First Round:

 $A_1$  chooses  $a_1 \in G_1$ ,  $b_1 \in G_2$ , computes  $a_1 \le b_1$  sends it to  $A_2$ .

```
A_2 chooses a_2 \in G_1, b_2 \in G_2, computes a_2 \le b_2 sends it to A_3 chooses a_3 \in G_1, b_3 \in G_2, computes a_3 \le b_3 sends it to b_3 \in G_2, computes b_3 \in G_3.
```

#### Second Round:

```
A_1 computes a_1\ a_3\ w\ b_3\ b_1 and sends to A_2. A_2 computes a_2\ a_1\ w\ b_1\ b_2 and sends to A_3. A_3 computes a_3\ a_2\ w\ b_2\ b_3 and sends to A_1. On knowing a_1 , b_1, A_1 computes K\ _{A1}=a_1\ a_3\ a\ _2w\ b_2b_3\ b_1 . On knowing a_2, b_2 , A_2 computes K_{A2}=a_2\ a_1\ a_3\ w\ b_3\ b_1\ b\ _2. On knowing a_3, b_3, A_3 computes K_{A3}=a_3\ a_2\ a_1\ w\ b_1\ b_2\ b\ _3. K_{A1}=K_{A2}=K_{A3} is their common shared key.
```

## 4.3. Multi Party Key Exchange Protocol:

#### First Round.

```
\begin{array}{l} A_1 \ chooses \ two \ random \ elements \ a_1 \in G_1 \ , b_1 \in G_2. \\ A_1 computes \ K_{11} = a_{1W}b_1 \ and \ sends \ the \ same \ to \ A_2 \ . \\ A_2 \ chooses \ two \ random \ elements \ a_2 \in G_1 \ , b_2 \in G_2. \\ A_2 \ computes \ K_{12} = a_{2W}b_2 \ and \ sends \ the \ same \ to \ A_3. \\ A_3 \ chooses \ two \ random \ elements \ a_3 \in G_1 \ , b_3 \in G_2. \\ A_3 \ computes \ K_{13} = a_{3W}b_3 \ and \ sends \ the \ same \ to \ A_4. \\ \\ \\ \\ A_{k-1} \ chooses \ two \ random \ elements \ a_{k-1} \in G_1 \ , b_{k-1} \in G_2. \\ A_{k-1} \ computes \ K_{1k-1} = a_{k-1W} \ b_{k-1} \ and \ sends \ the \ same \ to \ A_k \ A_k \ chooses \ two \ random \ elements \ a_k \in G_1 \ , b_k \in G_2 \\ A_k \ computes \ K_{1k} = a_k \ wb_k \ and \ sends \ it \ to \ A_1. \end{array}
```

 $A_1$  computes  $K_{21}=a_1$   $K_{1k}$   $b_1$  and sends the same to  $A_2$   $A_2$  computes  $K_{22}=a_2K_{11}$   $b_2$  and sends the same to  $A_3$ .  $A_3$  computes  $K_{23}=a_3$   $K_{12}$   $b_3$  and sends the same to  $A_4$ .

#### Second Round.

```
\begin{array}{l} \dots \\ A_{k-1} \ computes \ K_{2(k-1)} = a_{k-1} \ K_{1k-2} \ b_{k-1} \ and \ sends \ the \ same \ to \ A_k. \\ A_k \ computes \ K_{2k} = a_k \ K_{1(k-1)} \ b_k \ and \ sends \ the \ same \ to \ A_1. \\ \hline \\ (\textit{K-1})^{\textit{St}} \ \textit{Round:} \\ \\ A_1 \ computes \ K_{(k-1)1} = a_1 a_k \ a_{k-1} \ \dots \ a_2 \ w \ b_2 \dots \ b_{k-1} b_k b_1. \\ \\ A_2 \ computes \ K_{(k-1)2} = a_2 \ a_1 a_k \ a_{k-1} \ \dots \ a_3 \ w \ b_3 \dots \ b_{k-1} b_k \ b_1 \ b_2. \\ \\ \\ A_k \ computes \ K_{\ (k-1)} \ (k-1) = a_{k-1} \ a_{k-2} \ a_{k-3} \ \dots \ a_1 a_k \ w \ b_k b_1 \dots \ b_{k-3} b_{k-2} \ b_{k-1} b_{k-1}. \\ \\ A_k \ computes \ K_{\ (k-1)k} = a_k \ a_{k-1} \ \dots \ a_1 \ w \ b_1 \dots \dots \ b_{k-1} \ b_k. \\ \end{array}
```

# 5.Key Agreement Protocol Using Conjugacy Search Problem:

 $K_{(k-1)1} = K_{(k-1)2} = \dots = K_{(k-1)k}$ , their common shared key.

The Conjugacy Search Problem (Csp):

Since  $a_1, a_2, \dots, a_k \in G_1$  and  $b_1, b_2, \dots, b_k \in G_2$ ,

The conjugacy search problem is : Given a recursive presentation of a group G and two conjugate elements  $x,y \in G$ , find a particular element  $g \in G$  such that  $g^{-1} \times g = y$ .

### 5.1. KAP With Two Party:

Two parties A and B agree on a finite non-abelian group ,Discrete Heisenberg group  $\mathcal{H}=Z_p^{\ 3}$  and a cyclic subgroup  $G_1=<$  e ,a ,b > , where ab = ba , a,b are generators of  $G_1$ . 1.A publishes an element  $w\in\mathcal{H}=Z_p^{\ 3}$  such that w does not commute with a and b.

```
2.A chooses an element \,g_1 \in G_1\, , computes \,g_1^{\, -1}\, w\,\,g_1 and sends it to B 3.B chooses an element g_2 \in G_1, computes g_2^{\, -1}\, w\,\,g_2 and sends it to A 4.On knowing \,g_1, A computes K_A = g_1^{\, -1}g_2^{\, -1}\, w\,\,g_2g_1 5.On knowing g_2, B computes K_B = g_2^{\, -1}g_1^{\, -1}\, w\,\,g_1g_2 K_A = K_B is their common shared key.
```

# 5.2. KAP With Three Party:

Three parties  $A_1$ ,  $A_2$  and  $A_3$  agree on a finite non-abelian group ,Discrete Heisenberg group  $\mathcal{H}=Z_p^3$  and a cyclic subgroup  $G_1=<$  e ,a, ,b , where ab= ba ,a, ,b are generators of  $G_1$ .

One of the three parties publishes an element  $w \in \mathcal{H}$  such that it does not commute with a and b.

#### FirstRound:

```
A_1 chooses an element \ g_1 \in G_1 ,computes K_{11} = g_1^{-1} \ w \ g_1 and sends it to A_2 A_2 chooses an element \ g_2 \in G_1 ,computes \ K_{12} = g_2^{-1} \ w \ g_2 and sends it to A_3 A_3 chooses an element \ g_3 \in G_1 ,computes \ K_{13} = g_3^{-1} \ w \ g_3 and sends it to A_1
```

#### Second Round:

```
A_1 computes K_{21}=\ g_1^{-1}\ K_{13}\ g_1 and sends it to A_2 A_2 computes K_{22}=g_2^{-1}\ K_{11}\ g_2 and sends it to A_3 A_3 computes K_{23}=g_3^{-1}\ K_{12}\ g_3 and sends it to A_1 On knowing g_1 , A_1 computes K_{31}=g_1^{-1}\ K_{23}\ g_1 On knowing g_2 , A_2 computes K_{32}=g_2^{-1}\ K_{21}g_2 On knowing g_3 , A_3 computes K_{33}=g_3^{-1}\ K_{22}\ g_3 K_{31}=K_{32}=K_{33} is their common shared key.
```

## 5.3. KAP With Multi Party Using CSP:

# First Round:

### Second Round

```
\begin{array}{l} A_1 \text{ computes } K_{21} = g_1^{-1} \ K_{1k}g_1 \text{ and sends it to } A_2 \\ A_2 \text{ computes } K_{22} = g_1^{-1} \ K_{11}g_1 \text{ and sends it to } A_3 \\ A_3 \text{ computes } K_{23} = g_1^{-1} \ K_{12}g_1 \text{ and sends it to } A_4 \\ A_4 \text{ computes } K_{24} = g_1^{-1} \ K_{13}g_1 \text{ and sends it to } A_5 \end{array}
```

 $A_k$  computes  $K_{2k}=g_1^{-1} K_{1k}g_1$  and sends it to  $A_1$ 

# $(K-1)^{St}$ Round:

```
\begin{array}{l} A_1 \text{ computes } K_{K\text{--}1\ l} = g_1^{-1}\ K_{(k\text{--}2)k}\ g_1 \text{ and sends it to } A_2 \\ A_2 \text{ computes } K_{k\text{--}12} = g_2^{-1}\ K_{(k\text{--}2)2}\ g_2 \text{ and sends it to } A_3 \\ A_3 \text{ computes } K_{k\text{--}1\ 3} = g_3^{-1}\ K(k\text{--}2)_1g_3 \text{ and sends it to } A_4 \\ & ... \\ A_k \text{ computes } K_{(k\text{--}1)k} = g_k^{-1}\ K_{(k\text{--}2)(k\text{--}1)}\ g_k \text{ and sends it to } A_1 \end{array}
```

```
\begin{split} &A_1 \text{ computes } K_{k1} = g_1^{-1} \ K_{k-1k} \, g_1 \\ &A_2 \text{ computes } K_{k2} = g_2^{-1} \ K_{(k-1)1} \, g_2 \\ &A_3 \text{ computes } K_{k3} = g_3^{-1} \ K_{(k-1)1} \, g_3 \\ & & \\ & & \\ &A_k \text{ computes } K_{k3} = g_k^{-1} \ K_{(k-1)(k-1)} \, g_k \\ & & \\ &K_{k1} = K_{k2} = K_{k3} = K_{k4} \ \dots \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & & \\ & &
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# 6. KAP Using Twisted Conjugacy Problem:

### Twisted Conjugacy Problem:

Let G be a countable discrete group and  $\varphi : G \to G$  an endomorphism. An element  $y \in G$  is said to be twisted conjugate of an element  $x \in G$ , iff there exists  $g \in G$  with  $y = g \times \varphi (g^{-1})$ .

#### 6.1. KAP With Two Parties:

Two parties A and B agree on a finite non-abelian group, Discrete Heisenberg group  $\mathcal{H} = \mathbb{Z}_p^3$  and a cyclic subgroup  $G_1 = \langle e, a, b \rangle$ , where ab = ba, a, b are generators of  $G_1$ .

```
A publishes an element w \in \mathcal{H} = Z_p^{-3} such that w does not commute with a and b. A chooses an element g_1 \in G_1, computes g_1 w \varphi(g_1^{-1}) and sends it to B B chooses an element g_2 \in G_1, computes g_2 w \varphi(g_2^{-1}) and sends it to A On knowing g_1, A computes K_A = g_1 g_2 w \varphi(g_2^{-1}) \varphi(g_1^{-1}) On knowing g_2, B computes K_B = g_2 g_1 w \varphi(g_1^{-1}) \varphi(g_2^{-1}) K_A = K_B is their common shared key.
```

# 6.2.KAP With Three Parties:

Three parties  $A_1$ ,  $A_2$  and  $A_3$  agree on a finite non-abelian group ,Discrete Heisenberg group  $\mathcal{H}=Z_p^3$  and a cyclic subgroup  $G_1=\langle e,a,b\rangle$ , where ab=ba, a, b are generators of  $G_1$ . One of the three parties publishes an element  $w\in\mathcal{H}$  such that it does not commute with a and b.

# First Round:

```
\begin{array}{l} A_1 \ \ \text{chooses an element} \ \ g_1 \in G_1 \ , \text{computes} \ \ K_{11} = g_1 \ w \ \phi \ (g_1^{-1}) \ \text{and sends it to} \ A_2 \\ A_2 \ \text{chooses an element} \ \ g_2 \in G_1 \ , \text{computes} \ \ K_{12} = g_2 \ w \ \phi \ (g_2^{-1}) \ \text{and sends it to} \ A_3 \\ A_3 \ \text{chooses an element} \ \ g_3 \in G_1 \ , \text{computes} \ \ K_{13} = g_3 \ w \ \phi \ (g_3^{-1}) \ \text{and sends it to} \ A_1 \end{array}
```

## Second Round:

```
\begin{array}{l} A_1 \ computes \ K_{21} = g_1 \ K_{13} \ \phi \ (g_1^{-1}) \ and \ sends \ it \ to \ A_2 \ A_2 \ computes \ K_{22} = g_2 \ K_{11} \ \phi \ (g_2^{-1}) \ and \ sends \ it \ to \ A_3 \ A_3 \ computes \ K_{23} = g_3 \ K_{12} \ \phi \ (g_3^{-1}) \ and \ sends \ it \ to \ A_1 \ On \ knowing \ g_1 \ A_1 \ computes \ K_{31} = g_1 \ K_{23} \ \phi \ (g_1^{-1}) \ On \ knowing \ g_2 \ A_2 \ computes \ K_{32} = g_2 \ K_{21} \ \phi \ (g_2^{-1}) \ On \ knowing \ g_3 \ , \ A_3 \ computes \ K_{33} = g_3 \ K_{22} \ \phi \ (g_3^{-1}) \ K_{31} = K_{32} = K_{33} \ \ is \ their \ common \ shared \ key. \end{array}
```

# 6.3. KAP With Multi Party Using Twisted Conjugacy Problem:

 $A_1,\ A_2,\ A_3,\ A_4......A_k \ agree \ on \ a \ finite \ non-abelian \ group \ (Discrete \ Heisenberg \ Group) \ and \ they \ agree \ on \ a \ public \ element \ w \in \mathcal{H} = Z_p^3 \ and \ a \ cyclic \ subgroup \ G_1 = < e \ ,a \ ,b>, \ where \ ab = ba \ ,a \ ,b \ are \ generators \ of \ G_1$ 

#### First Round:

```
A_1 chooses an element g_1 \in G_1, computes K_{11} = g_1 \le \phi \ (g_1^{-1}) and sends it to A_2 A_2 chooses an element g_2 \in G_1, computes K_{12} = g_2 \le \phi \ (g_2^{-1}) and sends it to A_3 A_3 chooses an element g_3 \in G_1, computes K_{13} = g_3 \le \phi \ (g_3^{-1}) and sends it to A_4
```

#### 7. Conclusion:

In some of the previously proposed multi-party key agreement protocols there exists the difficulty of building an efficient computable multilinear forms. To over come such a difficulty, in this paper we have presented some Multi-party Key Exchange Protocols using search problems. The advantage of this protocol is, each user chooses only one set of secret keys and they are using the same for subsequent communications of the remaining rounds. In order to improve the security of the system, each user can change their secret keys for each communication.

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